The Competition Commission of India (CCI) issued an order under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002, directing the Director General (DG) to investigate alleged anti-competitive practices in the Delhi liquor market. The Informant, Mr. Mohit, raised two primary sets of allegations. The first concerned bid-rigging in tenders for the wholesale supply of country liquor in NCT Delhi (2022-2023), where narrow price bands were observed. The second set involved a complex web of cartelization and vertical restraints under the Delhi Excise Policy 2021-22 involving manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. Regarding the country liquor tenders, the Commission found the allegations unsubstantiated as the narrow price ranges were the result of the Excise Department's own negotiation and allocation processes. Similarly, horizontal cartel allegations between major manufacturers like Pernod Ricard and Diageo were deemed insufficient for investigation at the preliminary stage. However, the Commission found a prima facie case of violation of Section 3(4)(b) read with Section 3(1) concerning Pernod Ricard India Private Limited. Evidence, including internal emails and corporate guarantees, suggested that Pernod Ricard entered into exclusive dealing arrangements with specific retailers (including Khao Gali and others) to push its brands and foreclose competition in exchange for financial assistance. The Commission directed the DG to investigate Pernod Ricard and seven other entities (Indo Spirits, Pathway HR, Universal Distributors, Khao Gali, Bubbly Beverages, Shiv Associates, and Organomix Ecosystems) while dismissing the case against the other 33 original opposite parties.
BN Agrochem Limited (BNAC) has filed a notice under Regulation 13(2) regarding a proposed combination involving the merger of three entities: A1 Agri Global Limited (Agri), B.N. Agritech Limited (BNA), and Salasar Balaji Overseas Private Limited (Salasar) into BNAC. Pursuant to a Scheme of Amalgamation approved by the parties' boards on 28 June 2025, BNAC will be the surviving entity. The parties are involved in various stages of the edible oil value chain, including procurement, refining, repackaging, and trading of soya oil, palmolein oil, sunflower oil, and mustard oil. The parties assert that the proposed combination is primarily an internal restructuring between entities belonging to the same group aimed at enhancing operational efficiencies through integration of facilities, procurement, and inventory management. They contend that the transaction will not result in any change in the market position of the group or cause any appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in India. The relevant markets identified involve the sale of various types of edible oils in India. As this document is a filing notice submitted by the parties, the Commission's formal decision and competitive assessment are pending.
Mizuho Securities Co., Ltd. (Mizuho Securities) has filed a notice under Regulation 13(2) regarding its proposed acquisition of over 60% of the equity share capital of Avendus Capital Private Limited (ACPL) on a fully diluted basis. Mizuho Securities, part of the Mizuho Financial Group, provides global investment banking and market services, and operates in India through its subsidiary, Mizuho Securities India Private Limited, a SEBI-registered merchant banker. ACPL is also a SEBI-registered merchant banker offering M&A advisory, private equity syndication services, and equity capital market solutions across various sectors including digital technology, healthcare, and infrastructure. The parties have identified horizontal overlaps in the markets for investment banking services and lending services in India. Additionally, potential vertical linkages exist between the upstream provision of credit to financial institutions and downstream lending services. The parties assert that the transaction will not result in any appreciable adverse effect on competition. This document represents a summary filed by the parties; the Commission's competitive assessment and final decision are pending.
The proposed combination involves the acquisition of equity stakes and units in several entities managed by the Maple Infrastructure Trust by MAIF 4 Investments India 2 Pte. Ltd. (MAIF 4 India 2). Specifically, the acquirer proposes to purchase 42.5% of the equity share capital of Maple Infra InvIT Investment Manager Private Limited (Maple IM), 40.0% of the equity share capital of Maple Highway Project Management Private Limited (Maple PM), and up to 37.5% of the units of Maple Infrastructure Trust (Maple Trust). MAIF 4 India 2 is a newly incorporated investment vehicle wholly owned by the Macquarie Asia-Pacific Infrastructure Fund 4, which is ultimately controlled by Macquarie Group Limited. Maple Trust is a private infrastructure investment trust (InvIT) registered with SEBI that, through its special-purpose vehicles, owns and operates road assets in India under government concessions. Maple IM and Maple PM serve as the investment manager and project manager of the Trust, respectively. In the summary filed under Regulation 13(2) of the CCI (Combinations) Regulations, 2024, the parties submit that the transaction will not lead to any change in the competitive landscape or cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition, regardless of how the relevant markets are defined. The Commission's decision on the competitive impact is currently pending.
Motion JVCo Limited, Stonepeak Motion HoldCo Limited, Stonepeak Motion Infrastructure Fund Middle Holdings LP, BP Motion Holdings Limited, and CPP Investment Board Private Holdings (6) Inc. (collectively, the Acquirers) filed a Green Channel notice for the acquisition of 100% of the shares and voting rights of Castrol Group Holdings Limited (Target). The proposed transaction involves a multi-step restructuring where Motion JVCo will acquire the Target from BP p.l.c. Post-acquisition, BP Motion Holdings Limited will hold a 35% stake in Motion JVCo, while Stonepeak HoldCo will hold 65%. Additionally, CPPIB InvestCo will make an indirect co-investment in the Target. As the Target indirectly holds 51% of Castrol India Limited, the transaction triggers a mandatory open offer for up to 26% of the equity share capital of Castrol India. The parties asserted that the transaction involves no new horizontal, vertical, or complementary overlaps in India, as the Stonepeak and CPPIB entities are investment vehicles with no relevant Indian activities, and existing BP-Castrol linkages are unaffected. The combination was filed under the Green Channel route and is deemed approved.
The proposed combination involves the acquisition of 100% of the shares and voting rights in Castrol Group Holdings Limited (Target) by Motion JVCo Limited from BP p.l.c. The transaction is structured as a series of steps including: (i) the direct acquisition of the Target by Motion JVCo; (ii) a 35% reinvestment in Motion JVCo by BP Motion Holdings Limited (a subsidiary of bp), with the remaining 65% held by Stonepeak Motion HoldCo Limited; (iii) a capital investment by CPPIB InvestCo; and (iv) a mandatory open offer for up to 26% of the equity share capital of Castrol India Limited due to Motion JVCo's indirect acquisition of a 51% stake. The Acquirers include various special purpose vehicles managed by Stonepeak Partners LP and the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB), alongside bp. The Target is a global leader in lubricants, greases, and coolants for automotive, energy, and marine industries. As the Stonepeak and CPPIB entities had no Indian presence in the Target's business areas, and existing links between bp and the Target remained unchanged, the filing was submitted under the Green Channel route and was deemed approved by the Commission.
M/s Natural Support Consultancy Services Private Limited ('Informant') filed an information under Section 19(1)(a) against National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development ('NABARD'/'OP-1') and Infosys Limited ('Infosys'/'OP-2') alleging violations of Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act. The Informant, an IT services provider, alleged that NABARD's 2023 Request for Proposal (RFP) for the migration and upgradation of Core Banking Solutions (CBS) from Finacle 7.x to 10.x across 58 Cooperative Banks was anti-competitive. Specifically, the Informant claimed the RFP unfairly restricted participation to System Integrators (SIs) who were authorized partners of the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), Infosys. It was alleged that this exclusionary condition, combined with repeated extensions of previous contracts with Infosys and Wipro, created an anti-competitive arrangement and abused NABARD's dominant position as a regulatory mentor for Rural Cooperative Banks (RCBs). The Commission defined the relevant market as the 'Market for procurement of CBS services for Rural Co-operative Banks in India' and noted NABARD's dominance based on its statutory role. However, the Commission found that requiring authorized partners for software migration was a reasonable technical necessity to ensure compatibility, data security, and system integrity. Finding no evidence of an anti-competitive vertical agreement or abuse of dominance, the Commission determined no prima facie case existed and closed the matter under Section 26(2).
BP Alternative Energy Investments Limited (Acquirer), a subsidiary of BP p.l.c., has filed a combination notice under Regulation 13(2) of the Competition Commission of India (Combination) Regulations, 2024. The proposed transaction involves the acquisition of the remaining 50.03% equity share capital of Lightsource BP Renewable Energy Investments Holdings Limited (Target). BP currently holds a 49.97% stake in the Target; the transaction will increase this shareholding to 100%, effectively making it a wholly owned subsidiary. The Acquirer functions as a holding company for investments in gas and low-carbon energy segments for the global BP group. The Target is primarily engaged in the development, construction, and operation of utility-scale onshore renewable energy and energy storage projects globally. In their submission, the parties assert that there are no horizontal overlaps, vertical relationships, or complementary links between their activities within the Indian market, noting that the Target's previous Indian entities are no longer part of its group. Consequently, the parties suggest that the relevant market definition may be left open. This summary represents the parties' assertions at the filing stage, and the Commission's formal competitive assessment and final decision remain pending.
Vishakha Renewables Private Limited (VRPL), along with affiliates Vishakha Renewables 1 Private Limited (VR1PL), Vishakha Metals Private Limited (VMPL), Vishakha Metals 1 Private Limited (VM1PL), Vishakha Glass Private Limited (VGPL), and Progressive Pipes Private Limited (PPPL), submitted a notice under Regulation 13(2) for a proposed internal group restructuring. The combination involves a three-step process: first, the transfer of VRPL's pipes and mouldings divisions to PPPL via a slump sale; second, the amalgamation of VR1PL, VMPL, and VM1PL into VRPL; and third, the amalgamation of VRPL into VGPL (the Merged Entity). The parties operate across various segments of the solar energy and irrigation sectors. VRPL manufactures solar components like PID-resistant EVA encapsulants and back sheets, while other entities focus on aluminum frames, solar glasses, and metal components. PPPL and VRPL are also active in manufacturing micro-irrigation systems and various industrial pipes (PVC, HDPE). The parties assert that while the transaction involves vertical linkages within the solar photovoltaic modules market in India, it does not raise competition concerns or lead to an appreciable adverse effect on competition. As this document is a Regulation 13 filing notice, the final Commission decision remains pending.
The Informant, Ravi Sharma, filed information against Adani Enterprises Ltd. (OP-1), Adani Green Energy Four Limited (OP-2), Azure Power India Private Limited (OP-5), Solar Energy Corporation of India (OP-6/SECI), and several state-owned power distribution companies. The allegations concerned a SECI tender for 7 GW of solar power capacity linked to 2 GW of solar manufacturing capacity. The Informant alleged that SECI designed the Request for Selection (RfS) to favor top players like the Adani Group and Azure Power, claiming that Azure Power acted as a proxy for Adani to eventually transfer its allocated capacity. The Informant further referenced a US Department of Justice indictment involving allegations of bribery against the Adani Group to secure these contracts. The Informant alleged abuse of dominance under Section 4 and anti-competitive agreements/bid-rigging under Section 3. The Commission found no prima facie case of violation. It ruled that tender design is a procurer's prerogative and found no evidence of bid-rigging or coordinated conduct between Adani and Azure Power. Regarding dominance, the Commission noted significant competition from players like NTPC, Tata Power, and JSW Energy, concluding that the Adani Group was not dominant in the Indian power generation market. The case was closed under Section 26(2).